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Restrictive practices may prevent developing country seaports
from benefiting from investments in containerization and bulk
handling. Port loan appraisals should assess the changes needed
in labor arrangements and organization - and estimate com-
pensation payments needed for displaced workers.
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Containerization and modem bulk handling  practices are worth in terms of compensation
methods can substantially increase ship and labor  payments to displaced workcrs.
productivity. Early debate about whether these
methods are appropriate for developing countries  He gives examples of three approaches to
has largely ended.  At least on routes for which  abolishing restrictive practices - gradual,
one or more partners is a developed country,  reformist, and drastic.  He emphasizes that major
costs are minimized by modem, productive ships  changes in restrictive practices are normally
and appropriate port technology.  associated with changes in a port's cargo-
handling organization - by privatization or
But, Harding argues, many ports have failed  concession, for example.
to change their labor practices and to accept the
inevitable reduction in their labor force that  The Bank, concludes Harding, must enter the
technological advances call for. Those ports are  difficult area of labor organization if Bank-
doubly penalized:  by incurring investment costs  funded investments and trade-related projects are
and continuing to pay labor as if earlier labor-  to succeed. At appraisal, the Bank should
intensive rmiethods  still applied.  analyze the extent to which changes in labor
arrangements may be needed to realize project
Harding analyzes productivity-limiting or  benefits, and should examine labor organization,
high-cost practices known generically as "rcstric-  collective agreements and other labor arrange-
tive practices," especially the following: limits  ments, legal implications, and the investment's
on entry to work in the port, an exclusive defini-  impact on the work force.
tion of dock work, job demarcation to prevent
interchanging labor, work-sharing requirements  The cost of compensation payments should
within groups that prevent specialization, work-  be included in the economic and financial
extending practices, restrictive work hours, and  evaluation of a project. Effons involving labor
restrictions on output.  must be seen in the context of a move toward
greater private sector participation in:  n
Harding analyzes how restrictive practices  operations.  And where privatization is an issue,
increase shipping costs - by increasing ship  it is essential to analyze what associated changes
tumaround time and direct labor costs and by  in labor organization are implied and what
reducing labor productivity.  He also analyzes  opportunities these might offer to improve
how employment would be affected if these  working practices.
practices were abolished - or what these
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I.  Introduction
1.  Ports  have  been  transformed  over  the  past  twenty  five  years  in
their  appearance  and  in  the  scale  and  nature  of the  equipment  that  they  use
by the introduction  of  bulk  handling  methods  and  by containerization.  Both
of these  innovations  are  capital  intensive  and  have the  potential  for
substantial  and  indeed  dramatic  increases  in ship  and labor  productivity. 1
Earlier  debate  about  the  appropriateness  of these  methods  for  developing
countries,  where  labor  is  often  abundant  and  possibly  low  cost,  has largely
disappeared  as a result  of experience  and  of  economic  analyses  of round
voyage  costs,  which  demonstrate  that  at least  for  those  routes  where  one  or
more of the  partners  is  in a developed  country,  overall  minimum  cost is
achieved  by the  use  of  modern  high  productivity  ships  with  appropriate
technology  in the  ports  at  both  ends.  The  resulting  transport  system  thus
includes  both  high  capital  cost  vessels  and  capital  intensive  port
terminals,  so that  intensive  working,  normally  on a 24  hour  per  day  basis,
with an increasingly  skilled  and severely  reduced  labor  force,  is essential
if overall  costs  are  to  be minimized.
2.  Nevertheless,  many  ports  have failed  to change  their  manning
practices  and to  accept  the  inevitable  reduction  in their  labor  force,  in
line  with the  new  conditions  (Evans,  1969;  Wilson,  1972). In this  case  the
port is doubly  penalized,  by incurring  the  cost  of the  investment  in the
first  place  (in  many  cases  with  the  assistance  of a Bank  loan)  and  at the
same  time,  continuing  to  pay  labor  in accordance  with the  higher  manning
levels  appropriate  to the  previous,  labor  intensive  methods. Not
infrequently,  the  continuation  of the  previous  manning  arrangements  means
also  that  the  benefits  of the investment  in  terms  of ship  productivity  are
not fully  realized. The  pressure  to  maintain  obsolete  manning  levels  comes
most directly  from  the  labor  affected and  indirectly  from  government,
which  is reluctant  to face  the  political  and  financial  consequences  of
major  change,  in  terms  of substantial  compensation  payments  at  best and  the
cost  of interruptions  to the  foreign  trade  of the  country  at  worst.
1/  ship  productivity :  tons  per  day  at  berth
labor  produrtivity  :  tons  per  man  per  unit  of time
cost  per  ton  ship  cost  per  day  +  labor  cost  per  unit  of time
ship  productivity  labor  productivity- 2  -
3.  Port - ions are traditionally  pcwerful, partly on account of their
economic and political strength, partly on account of their ability to
impede trade; moreover, by their  nature, they are resistant to change.
However times are changing and there is now a growing list of ports and
countries where unions and employers, usually with encouragement from
government, have agreed on a "new deal" for port workers, with enhanced
skill levels and greater security for those  who remain and with
compensation for those who leave the industry, in return for the
modernization of working practices.  These agreements are inevitably very
positive in their effect on the cost of the foreign trade of the country.
4.  Manning levels are in general terms firfined  by the work agreements
or the labor agreements of each port.  These define conditions of service:
hiring and firing, pay and pensions, manning scales, health and safety
measures, and methods of work, often supplemented  by unwritten agreements
known as "customs  of the port".  Within the  work agreements and the customs
of the port are to be found the "restrictive  practices".  These are not
defined as such and indeed their identification depends to some extent on
the point of view of the observer,  whether management or labor.  The
definition adopted for this review is that restrictive  practices are those
practices, not themselves necessary for the  health or safety of the
workforce, which cause an enterprise to  operate in a less productive  way or
at a higher cost than is possible and reasonable. Such practices may
originate from government regulations. from  management decisions, from
labor agreements or from the "custom of the port".  Clearly cost is central
to any consideration of restrictive  practices, whether on the output side
as cost per ton handled, or on the input side as cost of labor.  Usually
cost is affected by the restrictive  practice as a derived variable, for
example when twelve men have to be allocated to a task that technically
requires  onlv ten.  However there are other practices  where cost enters
directly, for instance in the percentage increase in the normal rate that
is required for overtime work (where the hours classed as overtime have
been defined elsewhere); this is  where the borderline between a reasonable
or normal practice and a restrictive  practice begins to be subjective.  For
example, extra payment for the evening shift or for  night work may be
considered "reasonable"  and is certainly common, even though it  militates
against three shift working.  The ideal is to have equal payment on all
shifts,  with a shift rotation in order to achieve equitable treatment for
all members of the  workforce.
5.  Essentially, the point of view adopted here is that cost is the
principal though not the only parameter  with which to achieve change, as
evidenced in such expressions as "to  buy the book", that is to pay labor a
sum, either a lump sum or an increased hourly or tonnage rate, in return
for the freedom for management to fix  manning levels, flexibility and so
on.  Other important factors  may include job security, pension rights,
medical services and so on.  Not all management is responsible and such
freedom to  ix working practices necessarily implies some checks, provided
either by a union, by the existence of effective health and safety-3-
legislation  or  by the  existence  of an  unbiased  appeal  procedure  (or,  more
commonly,  a combination  of these  three)  and  it  would  be better  to talk  in
terms  of buying  the  old  book,  to  be replaced  by a  new  book that  is  more
appropriate  to the  new  working  environment.
6.  There  are  many  examples  of restrictive  practices  in  port  work  and
a P,'stematic  analysis  is  attempted  in  chapter  III. Well  known  examples  are
'spelling"  or the "welt" 2 ,  where  gang  members  alternate,  working  for  two
hours  then  resting  for  two  hours;  "continuity",  where  a gang  once formed
cannot  be  modified  until  its  task  - usually  emptying  one  hatch  on a ship  -
has  been  completed,  even  if the  nature  of the  cargo  changes  or there  are
more  uLgent  priorities;  "fixed  manning",  where  manning  scales  are
determined  irrespective  of the  nature  of the  cargo;  and "no-transfer",
where  for  example  a  man  classified  as a ship-worker  can  under  no
circumstances  form  part  of a shore  gang. Hours  of  work  are  arother  area  of
restrictive  practices;  for  example,  in  the  UK until  1967,  all  work outside
the  period  8 a.m.  - 5 p.m.  was classed  as  overtime,  effectively  preventing
normal  two  shift  working. In another  country,  work during  the  two  hour
lunch  break  is  charged  at 175%  of  the  normal  rate. These  practices
typically  have  a long  history  and  had  their  own  rationale  when they  were
introduced.  In  most  cases  they  are  inappropriate  for  modern  working
requirements  and  are  used  now  as  a form  of  protection  against  reductions  in
the  work force  and  as  a counter  in  the  bargaining  process.
7.  This  review  of the  scope  and  impact  of restrictive  practices  in
seaports  cargo  handling  has  been  prepared  as  an input  to the  INUTD  research
project:  "Labor  Redlndancy  in the  Transportation  Sector". Its  objective  is
to ascertain  the  extent  to  which  restrictive  practices  impede  the
realization  of the  benefits  of investments  in  port  modernization  and  to
provide  guidelines  for  easing  this  constraint.  More  specifically,  it
attempts  the  following:
a)  to  document  the  origins,  extent  and  most  common  types  of
restrictive  practices  in  porte  in developing  countries;
b)  to identify  all  of the  parties  concerned  and  the  extent  to  which
their  objectives  conflict  or coincide;
2/  "Welt"  is  a dialect  word from  NW England  meaning  "rotate"  or "revolve",
probably  of Old  Norse  origin  and  known  in the  region  at least  since  the
14th  Century,  as in "It  was a  wenyng  vn-war  (foolish  thought)  that  welt
in  his  mind",  from  the  poem  Patience,  as quoted  in "Early  English
Alliterative  Poems  in the  West  Midland  Dialect",  ed Richard  Morris,
1864.- 4 -
c)  to ascertain the ext.Lt to which restrictive practices inzerfere
with the efficient use of resources;
d)  to estimate the impact of restrictive  practices. and their
elimination, on employment;
e)  to ilentify the most successful  approaches to the elimination of
sun' practices in both developing and, to the extent that they are
relevant, developed countries;
f)  to assess  what related changes in cargo handling organization  may
be needed to permit the full realization  of potential productivity
improvements;  and
g)  to assess the role of incentives in the achievement of the above
objectives.
These topics are covered in  more or less detail, depending on the amount of
information  available.
II.  Scope of Enquiry and Nature of Dock Work
8.  Ports in developing countries are linked to the ports of the
developed  world by the ships that carry the trade between them.  This m?oans
that the work at both ends of the voyage is determined  by the same
technical requirements,  and that there is a read,y  means of communication
between the ports of the developing countries and those of the developed
countries.  Thus for example the "welt"  mentioned in para. 6 above, is
known in some ports of the  West Coast of South America as the "Liverpool'
welt.
9.  Ports in developed countries have tended - with many exceptions,
both in the developed countries and the developing countries - to be
quicker in revising their labor  agreements in line  with the new technology
than have ports in the developing countries, partly beceuse they invested
earlier, partly because their labor costs may be relatively higher, partly
because there  may have been better opportunities for the displaced labor to
find alternative  work.  In  no cases has the process been easy and in few
cases can it be said to be complete.  Wlat we are seeing now is the slow
extension of this process to the ports of the developing world, so that the
experience of the developed ports can supply useful indications of how (and
how not) tc tackle the problem of restrictive  practices in developing
country ports (always  excepting from this generalization the famously
efficient ports of the Far East,  which are more likely to teach the ports
of the developed countries than to learn from them).- 5 -
10.  For these reasons it  was decided to look at restrictive practices
in a ra.lge  of countries. Vis'ts were made to Venezuela and to Spain:  the
former  because of its notoriety for such practices (now  being tackled) and
the latter on account of the major changes in the organization of cargo
handling that are in process of implementation  there.  Written
contributions were obtained from Peru (Dr.  Teofilo Marin Aliaga, formerly
member of the Junta Directiva of the Empresa Nacional Portuaria) and from
Australia (Captain  Colin Wood, Cargo Handling Adviser to the  Waterfront
Workers Federation).  Peru is characteristic of traditional cargo handling
organization and practices, while Australia has recently established a
Waterfront Industry Reform Authority, to implement an "In-principle"
agreement, itself the result of a major enquiry (Inter-State  Commission,
1989;  Waterfront Industry  Reform Authority, 1989).  This report includes
brief annexes on each of the four above-mentioned countries.  Recent data
were also collected from Colombia, in the context of the ongoing Port
Rehabilitation loan 2635-CO.  In addition information  has been drawn  from
the Ul',  which has undergone major changes in  working practices, and from
other countries on a less systematic basis.
11.  Dock work is subiect to  major fluctuations in demand, arising from
the seasonality  of much of the cargo handled, from the freedom of the
shipowner to choose an alternative port and finally from the irregular
arrival patterns of the ships themselves, on account of the many
uncertainties inherent in sea transport.  On account of this fluctuating
demand, the industry has traditionally relied on a high proportion of
"casual"  workers, who are paid when there is  work and who receive  no pay on
the days when there is no work.  At the other end of the spectrum are the
"permanent"  or regular employees,  who receive a fixed wage, irrespective of
the demand.  Between these two extremes there exist  a great variety:  for
example "casuals"  with "fall-back"  pay for those dr., when there is no work
(or  who are guaranteed the equivalent of so  many days work each month) and
"permanents"  who receive a tonnage-related  element in their pay.  The
existence of casuals makes it very difficult to say exactly how many men
work in a port:  while it is probably better to talk in terms of "man-
shifts utilized" care has to be taken in drawing inferences from this
figure, on account of the fluctuating  work pattern.
12.  No doubt the ship's crew  was originally employed for the loading
and unloading of cargo.  At some distant time the owner of the ship (or  the
owneLs of the cargo) started to employ (casual)  gangs to load and unload
the ship, receiving the cargo from its own-rs, or handling it to them in
the case of imports.  As ships increased in size and owners increased in
number and in distance from the port, the practice arose of constructing
sheds adjacent to the quays, to hold cargo in safety,  until the owner  was
ready to take it.  Because these sheds  were not related to a specific ship,
they tended to be provided by specialized  companies, not necessarily, and
probably rarely,  engaged in ship  work.  Thus the traditional pattern grew
up of one group of men working in the loading and unloading of the ship and
another group in the  work of receiving, delivery and storage on the land.- 6 -
This separation  of the  labor  was itself  a reflection  of the  existence  of
different  organizations  for  the  two  activities:  the "ship's  agent"  on the
ship  and  the "shore  handler",  in  many cases  to become  the  port  authority,
on land. In some  cases,  for  example  Venezuela,  the  port  authority  took
over  all  work,  on ship  and  on shore;  in other  cases  the  private  sector  may
do  both,  by concession.  The  men  working  on the  ship (and  their  employers)
are  known  as "stevedores"  and  the  men  working  on the  shore  as 'dockers",  at
least  in  British-influenced  contexts,  though  much  confusion  exists  with the
terminology.  Labor  agreements  (and  restrictive  practices)  tend  to relate
separately  to each  of these  groups. Thus  in talking  of restrictive
practices,  it is  necessary  to relate  them  to the  organization  of  the  work,
in  order  to  be clear  as to  their  scope. Restrictive  practices  may  exist
also  within  specialist  groups  such  as engineering  staff  and  tally  clerks,
but  these  are  not  considered  separately  in  this  document.
III.  Findings
Origin  and  Classiiication  of  Restrictive  Practices
13.  Restrictive  practices  arose  in the  first  place  in response  to  the
perceived  need  to  bring  some  order  to  the  combination  of casual  workers  and
to the  variable  demand  ine-titable  in  dock  work.  The  need  was felt  by both
employers  and  workers;  for  instance  the "continuity  rule'  arose  initially
from  the  employers'  desire  to prevent  workers  from  abandoning  a poorly  paid
or difficult  cargo  when  a more  attractive  cargo  arrived. The 'welt"
started  as  a  way of ach'eving  high  output  on ships  importing  frozen  meat
during  the  first  world  war.  Other  practices  were the  result  of  official
commissions  set  up to resolve  conflict  in  the  docks. Thus  the  hours  of
work in  UK ports (para.  6)  were fixed  in  1920  by the  Shaw  CommisAon in the
context  of post-war  recession.  The  principal  written  sources  of
information  concerning  restrictive  practices  are  the  various  committees  of
enquiry  that  have looked  at the  organization  of dock  labor,  the  labor
agreements  themselves,  chapters  in  a limited  number  of  United  Nations  and
academ.c  publications  and  articles  and  reports  of a  polemic  nature  (see
especially  Baudelaire,  1986;  CMD  2734,  1965;  International  Dockers,  nd and
Oram,  1975).
14.  In  many cases  the  restrictive  practices  are  by '2ustom  of the
port'  and  not incorporated  specifically  in  the  labor  agreement,  so  that
oral  information  is  an important  source. For  example  the  collective
agreement  for  the  public  ports  of  Venezuela  states  (clause  ()  that "all
those  customary  conditions  or benefits...  favorable  to  the  worker...  which
are  not  specifically  mentioned  by the  agreement...  cannot  be modified  at
any time  except  by agreement  of the  two  parties.'
15.  Analysis  of the  large  volume  of inforition  collected  suggests  the
following  classification  of restrictive  practices:-7-
16.  Limitations on Entry.  Dock work is restricted in  most countries
to those  men who are "registered."  This practice arose for two x.asons:
partly to share out the  work during the peaks among those who had
experienced the lean times,  partly to correct the conflicts caused by the
older practice of the shipowner  contracting  with a "gang leader",  who was
then free to choose the  men for the  work at his uwn price.  Registration
was seen also as a way of raising  the level  of the casual worker and has
been for  many years encouraged  by the International Labor Organization
(ILO).  The practice is abused when the registered  group uses its position
for private profit, for example the practice in Chilean ports before the
labor reforms of 1983/84  of the registered  worker selling his right for
half the  wage, 'medio  pollo", earned by the purchaser (who in his turn
could sell  his purchased right in similar fashion, "cuarto  pollo" (CEPAL,
1989).  Many ports have developed two or more registers, in descending
order of priority.  Registration is  naturally a major element in any
agreement on reductions in the labor force.  Under certain conditions, for
instance  when there is a high fall-back  pay, there may be pressure from the
side of labor to register  more men.  Thus in Venezuela, a casual  worker who
is hired on 60 consecutive  working days has to be taken on to the permanent
register.  The process of registration implies some administrative unit,
especially for casual  workers, and in  many countries dock labor agencies
have been created to maintain the register and to act as intermediary
between worker and employer.  Examples are the Organization de Trabajos
Portuarios (OTM)  of Spain, now in  process of dissolution (UGT  Legislacion,
1988 and Annex 3), the National Dock Labor Board (NDLB)  of the UK, now
dissolved, and the Asociacion Nacional de Servicios de Estiba (ANSE)  of
Uruguay.  These bodies, by their nature as intermediaries,  tend not to  be
cost conscious and to resist reductions in the labor force, since their
influence depends in part on their size.
17.  Definition of Dock Work.  The concept of registration implies a
definition of "dock  work".  This may either be defined by legislation  or
within the labor agreement.  The question arises commonly as a serious
issue in two situations:
a)  when the port for reasons  cr policy or of shortage, hires
equipment to supplement its own equipment.  Thus the labor
agreement for Buenaventura,  Colombia, requires that any such
equipment shall  be operated by  port labor, rather than by the
operator of the owner of the equipment.  This agreement also
includes the requirement  that such equipment be maintained in the
port workshops: and
b)  in the consideration  of who is to do the work of consolidating and
emptying containers  when this work is done outside the port. Since
port labor is usually more highly paid than regular labor,  the
importer/exporter  will normally prefer to use his own labor.  In
the United States the 50 mile rule applies, so that all work
within this distance of the port, which was previously regarded as
dock work, continues to be subject to dock labor agreements.- 8-
There was a similar rule in  the UK, originally proposed as 5  mile  3
from the waterfront though later amended (in  the House of Lords)
to 0.5 miles.  In Buenaventura,  work in the free zone adjacent to
the port is included  within the port labor agreement.  Current
contract negotiations for  US Atlantic & Gulf ports include
jurisdictional issues concerning contairn.  c  repair and port related
computer  work done at inland locations.
18.  Job Demarcation.  Within the group or groups of registered
workers, there may be subgroups, starting from the basic divisice of ship
workers and shore  workers and going on to more specialist groups such as
winch operators and coal trimmers.  There are usually severe limitations on
transferability from one subgroup to another and in many cases a total
prohibition.  The Buenaventura la:  agreement for instance  defines the
minimum number of men that  may be on the register for shipwork (940).  Thus
if there is a shortage of, for example, equipment operators, more men have
to be recruited, even if there is a surplus  of shipworkers.  This lack  of
flexibility is naturally exacerbated  when the different grou,s  work for
different employers,  who may have different cost structures.  For example,
shipworkers are employed by a master stevedore who is paid on a per ton
basis by the shipowner  and so  may find it profitable to work at night.  The
shore gangs and  warehouse staff  may be paid on a daily basis and, depending
on the port tariff, there may be no way for their employer to recover the
cost of overtime or of night work.  li  Port Sudan there was in the mid
1980's the practice of 'dumping"  when the shipowner,  under pressure to
leave,  would work at night, placing the cargo on the otherwise deserted
quay.  The shore staff  would arrive in the morning faced  with the task of
sorting  out what had been dumped the  night before, probably delaying also
the start of their regular day  work and with obvious security problems.
19.  Work Extending.  In the days of conventional cargo, in order to
maintain working units and in order to reduce the scope for argument, the
practice arose of defining minimum (in  practice, fixed) gang sizes,
possibly  with minor variations for different cargoes.  The growth of
containerized and bulk cargoes has made such  minimum gang sizes technically
inappropriate,  as for instance In the allocation of a gang of say 32 men to
each hatch of a container ship,  when the only work required is the task of
unlashing the containers on arrival and securing them for departure,  which
might require a gang of  at most 12 men. In Puerto Limon, Costa Rica, a
minimum of two ship gangs  with 32 men eac' has to be allocated to any ship
that is  working cargo, including containe. ships that may be worki..g  with
only one hatch. Similarly  on bulk grain ships, even if  worked by mobile
pumps, there will be a relatively small requirement for labor, for
positioning the pumps and for clearing up.  Nevertheless, complete gangs
may be allocated to each hatch or, as in Puerto Caldera, Costa Rica, to
each pump.  Minimum numbers of men may also apply on a per ship basis.  In
Venezuelan ports, a minimum shore staff of 200 has to be allocated to each
ship that is  working, irrespective  of need.  The practice of "spelling'  has
been already mentioned, as has been the continuity rule (para 6).  One
effect of the latter, coupled  with the minimum gang requirement,  was to-9-
make it impossible to redistribute the men working on tne different hatches
of the same ship in the event of shortages, so that four gangs could be
idle,  waiting for additional  men, even though the men already available
would have been sufficient to  man three hatches.  The adve-t of
multipurpose ships, carrying both containers and conventional cargo, has
added a further complication since the two cargoes require different gang
sizes.  Even so efficient a port as Bren,en  has (or  had) problems in
persuading labor to accept modification of the gang size  within a shift,
when changing from one type of cargo to another.
20.  Restrictive Hours.  Most labor agreements and port tariffs define
the "normal"  working hours of the port.  For Puerto Cabello, Venezuela,
these are 7 a.m - ll a.m., 1 p.m - 5 p.m and 7 p.m - 11 p.m.  The times in
between, if  worked, carry a surcharge of 175Z.  The problem of overtime
payments is related to the difficulty of introducing standard two shift
working in the context of casual labor.  Two shift  working implies  a
certain stability  of demand, if the second shift is to be paid at normal
-ates.  The Cam - 5pm p.m rule in UK ports, referred to earlier (para.  6),
turned out to be an impediment to the introduction of two full shifts,  when
demand increased.  The problem of restrictive  hours is normally one of
cost. so that for example round-the-clock working, to pe.mit the fast
turnaround of a container ship  becomes, under traditional  arrangements,
prohibitively expensive.  Statements such as. 'the port operates on a 24
hour basis", have to be qualified by reference to the cost of achieving
this.  Weekend work under traditional arrangements is  usually at normal
rates only for Saturday  morning.  Thus Sunday  work in Venezuela costs
double the average of the week plus 17 l/2Z.  In comparison, in Barcelona,
Spain, work outside normal hours carries a 53Z surcharge  during the  week,
75Z during normal hours on Sundays and holidays and 10OZ outside normal
hours on these days.  This is an area where the distinction between extra
payment for  work during "unsocial"  hours and the requirement for an
unreasonable premium,  which amounts to a restrictive  practice, is a matter
for individual judgement (and  negotiation).
21.  Restrictions on Output.  Traditional port incentive schemes are
based on an agreed payment for the handling of a determined  minimumi  number
of tons per shift.  For example, in Barcelona, bales of American cotton
have a minimum tonnage rate of 180 t per shift, at a rate of Ps. 33.80 per
ton per man (with  a specified gang size).  Such schemes tend ovr  time to
become complex:  in the case of bales of cutton, the Barcelona stevedoring
tariff identifies 10 different types of cotton,  with a total 5 different
handling rates and 10 different payments.  Their effect on output tends
also to be restrictive:  on account of the continuity rule, the gang knows
that what is not handled one day will be there to be handled the next day,
so that there is usually little incentive to go above the  minimum tonnage.
For this reason the practice of supplementary informal  payments is often
encountered.  A variation on the incentive payment is the "job and finish",
where the gang on board ship completes a specified task and then leaves.- 10  -
This tends to disrupt the smooth flow ot cargo, since the  men on shore are
probably working e  a fixed  wage per shift.  For instance this is the case
at Montevideo, Uruguay where the men on board are hired through  ANSE and
the men on shore through the port authority.  Where the tonnage to be
handled is not specifically defined, it  may well be defined by 'custom  and
practice".  The rate of work may also be affected by unnecessary
operations; for instance there was for  many years in Rotterdam the
obligation to weigh all cargo handled overside, even when this  was not
required  by the cargo owner.
22.  Work Sharing.  With the wide variety of cargo handled in a port,
there is inevitably attractive cargo and unattractive cargo.  Attractive
cargo may pay better and require less effort,  whilst unattractive cargoes
include dirty and awkward items.  In order to give everyone an equal share,
the practice in many cases is for the men within a specific group to be
rotated, by means of a numbered list.  Where a port includes a mixture of
general cargo and container berths, unless a special agreement is reached,
this  means that men may work first on a general cargo ship then on a
container ship.  This prevents specialization  and so hinders productivity.
23.  Special Practices.  Different ports have their own special
arrangements: in Liverpo,l it  was the practice to allow two hours during
Sunday  work for attending church.  In the Venezuela agreement, where two
gangs  work in the same hatch, each is paid for the total tonnage handled.
Many ports have traditionally  paid an extra "rest" shift on the basis of
the average pay of the  week.  The labor agreement  may include  provision for
the payment of "premiums",  usually one extra  month's pay for so many years
of service.  These arrangements typically affect cost rather  more than
output and their reasonableness  depends on the basic wage.
Parties Concerned in Cargo Handling  Operations
24.  The commonest forms for the organization of cargo handling at a
non-specialized port are summarized  as follows:
Landlord  Shore  handling  Ship work
functions  and shed work
a)  port authority  port authority  port authority
b)  port authority  port authority  stevedores/ships  agents
c)  port authority  stevedore/ships  agents  stevedore/ships  agents
d)  private company  private company  private company
25.  The port authority itself  may be a state enterprise, municipal or
statutory, though these distinctions  do not concern us here.  Within this
general classification there exist many special arrangements; for instance
in the older London berths, the arrangement (b),  with the port authority
undertaking the shore  handling and shed  work, was modified under a "quay
and shed space agreement', so that functionally it operated as type (c).- 11 -
The ports of Colombia and Venezuela operate in principle as type (a),  with
the port authority undertaking all operations, though particu.arly in
Venezuela, the practice is for the private sector ships agents to undertake
much of the ship  work, as type (b).  The most usual traditional  arrangement
is type (b),  where the stevedores/ships'  agents undertake the work on
board.  The arrangement type (c)  may operate either on a common user basis,
so that different ships' agents  may work on the same berth, depending on
the ship, or under concession.  In the latter case one company, under
concession from the port authority,  undertakes all work for the contractual
period, either one year as in many West African ports of French influence,
or on a longer term basis.
26.  Two further organizational levels overlay the above basic
structure:  the first is defined by the arrangements for employing the  men
who undertake the  work.  In some cases - and this is the tendency now -
each organization  employs its  own  men on a permanent basis.  More
traditionally, the employer has a relatively  small number of permanent
staff, employing the rest, according to demand, on a daily or casual basis
(Phillips,  1985).  In this case the casual labor is often regulated, as
described above, by a government sponsored  agency, the former NDLB in the
case of the UK, the CAINAGOD in France, or the OTP in Spain before recent
changes.
27.  The second overlay relates to the union or syndical structure.
Traditionally the men who work on board ship belong to one or possibly more
unions (in the latter  case, according to the type of cargo), whilst the men
who work on shore belong to another union.  Both unions may belong to some
national body or, as in the split of USA West Coast longshoremen into the
ILWU-CIO and the ILA-AFL, in 1937, there  may more than one national body
contending for control (Magden,  1982).  The labor agreements will typically
be between one group (or  union) and the relevant grouping of employers, for
example all the ships' agents.  From this complexity arises the possibility
of non-concurrence of work times and  working arrangements.  The working
hours and practices of other groups, notably the Customs personnel, provide
another source of potential impediments  to smooth operation.  These
problems, accepted by years of practice on traditional berths, become of
greater significance for container or bulk berths,  where lost time assumes
a much greater cost.
Impact on the Efficient Use of Resources
28.  The costs associated  with restrictive  practices are primarily
those associated  with a higher than  necessary ship cost, on account of the
lost productivity achieved in terms of tons per ship day; those associated
with a higher than necessary labor (and  mobile equipment) cost per ton, on
account of the lower than necessary labor productivity, in terms of tons
per man hour; and those directly related to the cost of labor.  In extreme
cases, the low productivity at a port coupled  with a conviction that it can
not be improved,  has resulted in the provision of alternative facilities in
order to get round the problems of the first port, and hence a duplication- 12 -
of resources.  Examples of these are Felixstowe,  UK, the general cargo
berths at Port Qasim, Pakistan and the port of Ashdod, Israel, reacting
respectively  against the inefficiencies  of London, Karachi and Tel
Aviv/Haifa.  In 1947 when the NDLB was set up in the UK to regulate (and
protect) dock labor,  Felixstowe was too small to be included in the scheme.
This  meant that labor arrangements  at the port were not subject to the
restrictive  practices of the larger ports.  This, coupled  with energetic
and far-sighted  management, permitted the port to develop very fast  once
containerization  became of major significance,  on account of the port's
freedom to adopt efficient  working practices, so that it is now the largest
UK container port.  Port Qasim was originally conceived simply as an iron
ore/steel port: later, encouraged by the inefficiencies  of Karachi, general
cargo berths were developed at Port Qasim.  The competition provided by
these  berths has been the single  most important factor in the stimulus of
improvements  at Karachi. The case of Ashdod is more complex, combining
technical and locational features,  as well as considerations of efficiency.
29.  Low ship productivity (tons  per ship day) means that the ship
spends longer than necessary working at the berth, hence a higher than
necessary cost of ship time at berth.  In addition, in the situation  where
berth capacity is a limitation, the extended length of time spent at the
berth may result in an increase in the time ships spend  waiting for a berth
(ship  waiting time).  The effect of the low ship productivity is thus felt
in the total ship time in port.  The restrictive  practices that most affect
ship  productivity are restrictive  hours, restrictions on tonnage output and
job demarcation.  Work sharing (i.e  job rotation)  may also extend ship time
by the impact of less experienced staff  on ship productivity.  The impact
of restrictive  hours is probably the  most serious:  as noted above (para.
20), the restriction is usually expressed in cost terms.  Some typical
situations  are shown in the following graphs:
Cost  per  Cost per
gang hour  gong hour
I  I  *1  Li
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30.  The first gtaph shows a standard two shift operation  with an
increasing scale of cost for overtime and night work.  The second shows
approximately the Venezuelan cost pattern,  with a high premium for work
during the lunch period.  The ship-owner, conscious in less formal terms of
the situation presented in these graphs, and knowing the urgency to
complete  work on his ship, plans his work program accordingly.  The
decisions of one ship-owner  may naturally have implications for the other
ships  waiting for a berth Jn the port.  The ideal situation,  at least for
port users, would be one where work in all hours of the day bore the same
cost, a sicuation achieved usually by a pattern of rotating shifts.
31.  The restrictive practices that most affect labor and equipment
productivity are those concerned  with fixed gang size and gang allocation,
with restrictions  on output and with work sharing, all of which are aspects
of work extending, together with some of the varied special practices.
Fixed gang sizes arose probably as a mechanism encouraged by the employer,
to ensure that sufficient labor  was allocated to a hatch and that the  work
was done expeditiously and in such a way as to preserve the working unit.
With the introduction of more specialized forms of cargo packaging, such as
bulk grains and packaged timber, the fixed gang sizes  became technically
inappropriate but by that time established within the labor agreements and
subject to change only through negotiation.  The introduction  of roll
on/roll off (Ro/Ro)  ships and car carriers provided a fresh challenge for
traditional gang sizes and for  established job rotation arrangements.  With
these vessels the need for labor  may be highly peaked and, on account of
their complicated internal ramps  and lifts, is at the same time highly
specialized.  In addition these ships are more expensive to construct  than
conventional ships, so that their economic operation depends on fast and
economic port handling.  There have been years of negotiation in Peru
between  port labor, the labor regulatory body (which  is controlled  by the
Navy), ENAPU as the port authority  and user interests in an effort to
create the labor environment that  would permit the efficient operation of
coastal Ro/Ro vessels for steel  movements.  A similar problem arose in
Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, in the handling of the Ro/Ro vessels from  Miami,
and  was partially resolved  by the agreement to pay port labor the standard
shift payment, on condition that they did not involve  themselves in the
physical  work of unloading/loading  these vessels, thereby doubling the cost
of the operation.
32.  Spanish ports, following  the recent institutional  changes, have
made a major effort to negotiate specific gang sizes for each different
type of cargo, i.e to maintain the concept of a fixed gang size but to make
it product specific (see  Annex 3).  This is in contrast to the approach
which attempts to achieve flexibility in the determination of gang sizes.
33.  Work sharing arrangements  under which all men have an equal
opportunity of the best paying jobs - normally the more specialized jobs
such as container handling or steel handling - tend to act against high
productivity, since these jobs are by definition those  where a specialized
work force is most necessary.- 14 -
34.  Restrictions on output of the "job and finish" type may, in
addition to their impact on ship productivity,  also have a negative impact
on labor productivity, though this is not so clear-cut.  For the men
directly involved in the agreement, it  may be argued that the tonnage
agreed is a "reasonable" figure for a shift's  work and that it is a matter
of personal choice whether it is done earlier or later in the shift.  More
serious is the impact such agreements have when a second group of men, not
subject to the same  agreement, is involved for example in Montevideo,
Uruguay, as described above (para.  21).
35.  Limitations on job entry and on job demarcation  within the
registered  work force naturally have as one of their objectives the
maintenance of a wage level that is higher than would be achieved  with
unrestricted entry.  Port  workers, protected by such restrictions,  and
given the crucial role of ports in the national economy, have tended to
achieve a privileged wage level  compared with those employed in similar
though arguably less arduous jobs in  warehousing and other occupations.  In
recent years there  have been several examples where this privileged
position has resulted finally in a negative attitude towards the port
workers on the part of the general public and - probably more importantly -
on the part of the other unions affiliated with the central union
organization.  This change in attitudes has enabled the employers and
government to achieve major changes in port labor arrangements.  Such
examples are to be found in the UK, in Spain, possibly in Venezuela and
maybe, in the future, in Colombia.
36.  Systematic estimates do not exist of the overall cost impact of
restrictive  practices in a given port.  Evidence to the Devlin Enquiry in
the  UK (1965)  estimated the cost of the continuity rule alone to be between
8Z and 10? of the direct labor cost of unloading (CMD  3104, 1966).  The
recent  Australian enquiry (ref 14 and Annex 1) heard evidence from one
company that a 27% saving in direct labor  costs cculd be achieved by
removing restrictive  practices.  This figure is derived from the increased
productivity,  moderated by the cost necessary to achieve that productivity.
Thus the Australian Ce.,tre  for Transport Policy Analysis estimated in the
same enquiry that stevedoring productivity improvements of up to 602 were
possible, with direct labor cost savings of nearly 35Z (Robinson,  1987).
37.  The US West Coast Agreement of 1968, which essentially "bought the
book", that is achieved an agreement under which all restrictive practices
were in principle abolished,  provided for the establishment of a fund  of
US$10 million from the employers over a 5 year period, in order to
compensate displaced longshoremen.  The later East Coast Agreement was
rather different in concept in that men continued to draw a wage, although
not actually  working (or impeding the introduction  of new methods, chiefly
containerization).  More recently (1990)  under a new agreement between the
AFL-CIO International  Longshoremen's Association and the New York Shipping
Association, approximately 1500 dockers have been retired and cargo tonnage
charges dropped by US$l per ton, probably representing a reduction of about
10% of the handling cost.- 15 -
Impact  on  Employment
38.  In  very  general  terms,  the  employment  in a  port  may  be expressed
as:
Employment  E =  k +  a.tl +  b.t2 +  c.t3 +  d.t4
where  k is a fixed  number  of management  and  administrative
staff,  only  loosely  related  to the  tonnage  handled,
tl,  t2,  t3 and  t4 are  the  annual  tonnages  respectively  of general  cargo,
containerized  cargo,  dry  bulk  cargo  and  liquid  bulk
cargo.
a,  b, c and  d are  labor  productivity  indices  for  each  type  of cargo.
39.  The  overall  port  productivity,  expressed  in  terms  of the  tonnage
handled  per employee  year,  is  given  by:
tl +  t2 +  t3  +  t4
E
so  that  overall  port  productivity  is affected  both  by any  increases  in the
efficiency  with  which  each  specific  type  of cargo  is  handled  and  - probably
more significantly  - by  changes  in the  proportions  of the  different  types
of cargo. The subject  is  worthy  of  much  more  detailed  attention,  but  an
overall  picture  can  be obtained  from  the  figures  given  in the  ILO  report  on
the  impact  of new  cargo  techniques,  published  in 1986  and  with  data
referring  mostly  to 1983/4  and  to the  mid 1970's  (Couper,  1986). From  the
data  of that  report  (and  with  many  qualifications  concerning  manifest  and
undetected  errors)  a graph  has  been  prepared  showing  changes  in  overall
port  productivity  between  the  mid 1970's  and  the  early  1980's,  related  to
the  percentage  of containerized  cargo  at the  two  dates. For  ease  of study
the  graph  is in  two  sections  (figures  la and  lb). It  will  be appreciated
that  the  data  of the  report  did  not  permit  a separate  identification  of
bulk  cargoes,  so  that  any  changes  in their  relative  tonnage  will  distort
the  results. Nevertheless,  the  overall  trend,  of increasing  productivity
related  to  an increasing  proportion  of containerization,  is clear.
40.  In the  graphs,  a nearly  vertical  line  indicates  that  increases  in
productivity  have  been  achieved  without  a significant  increase  in  the
proportion  of containerized  cargo. This  applies  to the  ports  of Inchon,
Antwerp,  Tai  Chung,  Port  Kelang  and  Sydney,  though  it should  be noted  that
there  are substantial  tonnages  of  bulk  traffics  in  all  these  ports,  so that
the  results  must be treated  with  caution.
41.  By contrast,  a nearly  horizontal  line  indicates  that  the
percentage  of containerized  traffic  increased  significantly  but  without  any
increase  in  productivity.  These  include  the  ports  of Bombay,  Colombo  and
Freetown,  among  others. The  ports  of  Venezuela  actually  experienced  an- 16 -
overall  decline  in  productivity  despite  an increase  in  the  proportion  of
containerized  cargo  during  the  period  analyzed. These  are  data  from  the
mid-i980's  and  certainly  in  Bombay  and  in  Venezuelan  ports,  major  efforts
are  now  underway  to raise  productivity  to  more acceptable  levels.  The
general  tendency  is  clear: increased  containerized  traffic  results  in a
very  substantial  increase  in  productivity,  substantially  more than  is
likely  to  be taken  up by traffic  increases.  In quantitative  terms,  an
increase  of  between  1OZ  and  20Z  in  the  level  of  containerization  may  result
in a threefold  or fourfold  increase  in overall  productivity.  These  general
results  are  borne  out  by the  specific  results  for  the  UK reported  in  an
earlier  report  (Galenson,  1989,  page  87).
42.  Given  that  the  increase  in the  proportion  of containerized  cargo
and  of bulk  cargoes,  is  a  world  wide and  inescapable  phenomenon,  the
reduction  of restrictive  practices  is  now  largely  synonymous  with the
adaptation  of labor  practices  to  these  new  methods  of cargo  presentation.
The  port  industry  world  wide is  changing  from  a labor  intensive  industry
relying  on limited  mechanization  and  moderate  specialization  to a  highly
mechanized  industry  with a  high  degree  of specialization  and  a
substantially  - and  dramatically  - reduced  labor  force. These  changes  are
largely  inevitable  because  of the  relative  economics  of  bulk/container
compared  with conventional  ships,  which  strongly  favor  the  former. The
international  nature  of shipping  operations  means  that  high  labor  costs  at
one  end  of the  voyage,  usually  in  a developed  port,  tend  to  drive  change  in
the  port  at the  developing  country  end  of the  route. For  example,  an
analysis  of the  Papua  New  Guinea  to  Australia  route  showed  clearly  that
overall  route  economics  favored  containers,  on  account  of the  costly
practices  in  Australian  ports,  despite  the  cost  pattern  of the  ports  in
Papua  New  Guinea  and  the  inland  transport  restrictions  there. In addition
the  advantages  of  multimodal  (door  to door)  transport,  which  are in
practical  terms  realizable  only  with  containerized  or some  similar  form  of
transport  and  handling,  favor  the  new  methods. Within  the  different
options  open  to  the  developing  port  for  container  handling,  there  will be
differing  degrees  of labor  intensity  and  this  should  be a factor  in their
selection. It remains  true  however  that  there  is  no truly  labor  intensive
method  of  handling  a container  that  is  20 feet  long  and  may  weigh  up to 25
tons  (and  still  less  a 40 foot  container).
Approaches  to the  Elimination  of Restrictive  Practices
43.  Three  basically  different  approaches  may be identified  in the
effort  to eliminate  restrictive  practices:
a)  gradualist:  in this  approach,  the  existing  labor  agreements  are
modified  by negotiation,  in the  attempt  to achieve  the  progressive
elimination  of restrictive  practices;
b)  reformist: in  this  approach  the  existing  labor  agreements  are
replaced  by a new  agreement,  which  represents  a major  departure
from  previous  practices;  and- 1  7 -
c)  drastic: in  this  approach  a radical  change  is  made  to the  way
labor  is  organized  and  contracted,  with a resulting  de facto
change  in  the labor  agreements.
44.  An example  of the  gradualist  approach  is  provided  by Colombia.
Here  every  two  years  the "Convencion  Colectiva"  is renegotiated,  first  for
the  Atlantic  coast  ports  (Cartagena,  Barranquilla  and  Santa  Marta),  then
for  the  Pacific  coast  port  of Buenaventura.  Thus  for  example  in  the  1989
negotiations  for  Buenaventura,  the  management  side  negotiators  were
instructed,  among  other  items,  to try  to  achieve  a reduction  of the
restrictive  practices  affecting  container  handling,  and  indeed  for  the
first  time  a payment  based  on a per  box  rate  was  achieved,  where  previously
the  rate  paid  had depended  on the  contents  of the  container.
45.  The  difficulty  with  the  gradualist  approach  is that  advances  in
one  area  may  have  to  be at the  expense  of giving  way in another,  so  that  in
the  example  from  Buenaventura,  the  requirement  that  equipment  be maintained
in  the  port  workshops  (see  para.  17  above)  is itself  of recent  introduction
and  is aimed  at preventing  the  contracting  out  of such  work.  The labor
agreement  may  also  have  agreed  minimum  overall  numbers. For  example,  the
Buenaventura  agreement  includes  minima  of 1316  for  ship  and  shore  labor
plus  190  winch  operators  (compared  with requirements  of 1475  and  220
respectively  in  the  agreement  for  1981/1982).  The  agreement  also  includes
(Articulo  39)  a paragraph  protecting  the  employee's  position  in case  of
automation  (mechanization):  "when  a port  worker  suffers  a reduction  in  his
income  because  of the  results  of the  automation  of cargo  handling,  the
Employer  in agreement  with the  Union  will fix  a  minimum  guaranteed  salary,
to  ensure  an adequate  payment."
46.  Examples  of the  reformist  approach  are  provided  by the  US West  and
East  Coast  agreements,  which  effectively  replaced  earlier  agreements  and
more recently  by the  in-principle  agreement  reached  in  Australia
(Waterfront  Industry,  1989). This  strengthens  the  bond  between  worker  and
employer,  requires  the  employer  to  negotiate  an "enterprise  agreement"
based  on a detailed  labor  resources  plan  and  improves  the  terms,  including
guaranteed  pay,  that  are  offered  to  the  supplementary  (i.e,  non  allocated)
labor. The  lubrication  for  these  changes  is  provided  by the  government's
agreement  to  make available  A$154  million  (US$135  million)  on a dollar  for
dollar  basis  with industry  for  the  early  retirement/redundancy  package,
training  and  workplace  restructuring.  The  success  of such  an agreement
depends  on the  ability  to involve  all  employers  and  all  union  branches  in
its  implementation,  and  there  have  been  some  signs  of resistance  (and
impatience),  mostly  from  the  employers'  side,  though  this  is to  be expected
in  so fundamental  a change.
47.  The  best  known  example  cf the  drastic  approach  is  provided  by
Chile,  which  in  1983  by means  of law  18032  abolished  the "matricula"  or
right  to  work in  Chilean  ports,  permitting  instead  a "free-for-all"
situation,  in  which  employers  were free  to choose  whom they  wished. About
US$70  million  was paid  in  compensation  to those  affected. The  change  is- 18 -
described in more detail in a recent  CEPAL publication (CEPAL,  1989).  It
is probably unlikely that such an action is reproducible,  at least in
covntrie.s  with representative  government.
48.  The Spanish approach combines elements of the gradualist with
relatively drastic organizational changes.  Workers previously administered
througn the OTP have been transferred  as employees of new joint
governtment/emplover  companies (see  Annex 3), with whom new contracts are
being,  negotiated.  The principal practical effect of the change is that the
new companies have to be self financing, so that they are under pressure to
negotiate away restrictive practices.  This, coupled with the generally
competitive environment of Spanish ports, is likely to be a reasonably
effective strategy for improving  port efficiency in the medium term.  In
the longer term the proportion of workers permanently allocated to the
individual employers, at present around 30%,  will increase.
Related Changes in Cargo Handling Organization
49.  The increasing specialization  of port labor and the sharply
reduced  numbers required  have meant that the previous organization  with
labor pools, the rotation of work, fixed gang allocations and so on, can no
longer be accepted.  At the same time, the previous practice of regular
working hours with an expensive  premium for overtime  work is not suitable
for high productivity ships,  whose time in port may be measured in hours
rather than in days.  The aim now is to have smaller  numbers of more
specialized  workers, available on a more flexible time basis.
50.  Parallel to these changes affecting labor arrangements, the growth
of specialized terminals has led to an increase in management
specialization either of different operating units within one organization
or from the entry of private sector firms.  The previous "horizontal"  port
organization  with separate firms  working on the ships, on the quays and
possibly even in the sheds is giving  way to a "vertical"  organization, in
which work on a berth or group of berths - ship, shore and shed - is
concentrated into one management unit.
51.  The emergence of these management units, coupled with the need for
increased labor specialization,  has resulted  in a movement away from the
casual employment of large  numbers of men to the permanent employment of
much smaller  numbers, allocated to individual employers on a full time
basis (with  or without a tonnage related  element in theit pay).  This is
the process of 'decasualization".  For the individual  employer it means
that he has the highly trained labor force that  he requires.  At the same
time it represents  an increase in his fixed costs, so that he has every
incentive to increase labor  productivity and to encourage flexibility
between the different tasks  on the terminal.  The abolition of restrictive
practices, the decasualization of labor, compensation payments for
redundant labor and the emergence of separate  management units, most
probably by the entry of the private sector, are all elements in the
improvement of port efficiency.- 19  _
Privatization of Cargo Handling
52.  The transfer of cargo handling operations from the port authority
or from some other public sector entity, to the private sector,  by means of
concessions throws into relief the need to reconsider  working methods
including restrictive  practices (Baudelaire,  1989).  It is clearly
preferable, for the new operators, that they should  be free to improve
efficiency, though the extent to which this is possible will depend largely
on the attitude and influence of the unions Involved.  In some cases the
union representing port authority, employees  may be different from that
representing the private sector employees; thus the fact of transfer of
cargo  handling to the private sector implies a transfer from one union to
another and in the process the modification of  working practices.  Where
there is a single, strong  union, the fact of public or private sector
control  may have a lesser effect on working practices, at least in the
short term.  The long  history of union resistance to the entry of private
sector operators in the new port for Bangkok shows ho.w  difficult the change
can be.  Nevertheless, at the least the transfer should offer the
opportunity for a reconsideration  of traditional  practices.  Thus the
transfer of the Port Kelang container terminal from the Kelang Port
Authority (KPA)  to the Kelang Container Terminal Company (KCT) included a
series of changes in the labor agreement governing  working practices,  with
a reduction in the work force, limited long term security and promotion
linked to performance rather than to seniority; these changes  were
negotiated in return for higher pay and better conditions (Levy,  1989).
53.  The privatization of specific operations may offer a way of
eliminating restrictive  practices that have been found to be particularly
onerous, for example  i  the case of shed  work at the port of Manila,
Philipines.  This wor ,  done previously by port authority personnel, was
subject to various practices that resulted in delay in the delivery of the
goods and reduced revenue for the port authority.  In 1988 the work was
transferred to a private contractor  with a revenue linked formula for  his
payment, apparently  with positive results for both port users in terms of
better service and for the port authority in terms of increased revenue.
The Role of Incentives in the Achievement of Change
54.  There are three parties involved in the process of change in port
labor arrangements:  port labor itself, the port employers,  whether public
sector or private sector, and the government.  Port labor is typically
organized both at the local level  and at the national level, as part of the
national confederation  of labor  unions and the interest  of the local  union
and the  national confederation  may not always coincide, on account of the
above average  wage level typically  enjoyed (at least in the eyes of workers
employed in other industries)  by port workers.  For the port labor, the
abolition of restrictive  practices and the resulting redundancies represent
the surrender of advances that  have been achieved over many years of
negotiation and struggle.  The advantages that they see in the changes are- 20 -
the  future  security  that is  offered,  albeit  for  a reduced  workforce,  and
the  possibility  of a  more regular  - and  possibly  higher  - average  wage.
The  process  of change  has to  be lubricated  by substantial  compensation
payments  for  those  displaced.
55.  The  employers  see  the  advantage  of change  in increased
productivity  and  hence  in  higher  profits  and  in  a reduction  in the
uncertainty  and  strife  associated  with traditional  arrangements.  However
the  same  technological  factors  that  require  a reduction  in the  labor  force
imply  also  a reduction  in the  number  of employers,  on account  of the  need
for  substantial  investments  in  new  equipment  and working  capital,  and  this
may represent  an inhibiting  factor  to  change. Where  the  present  employer
is  a port  authority,  other  factors  may inhibit  change,  including  political
pressures,  the  mixed  objectives  of such  bodies  when  engaged  in  cargo
handling  operations  and  possibly  a direct  interest  on the  part  of the  port
authority  employees  in  the  labor  agreements.  There  may  also  be legal
impediments;  for  example  in  Venezuela  it is  considered  that  the  labor
agreement  and  the  port  authority  (the  Instituto  Nacional  de Puertos)  are
legally  inseparable,  so  that  any  major  reform  of the  labor  agreement  will
involve  a similarly  drastic  reform  of the  authority.
56.  The incentives  for  the  government  to initiate  reform  in port  labor
arrangemenzs  are  twofold. In  part they  co'me  from  the  government's  role  as
guardian  of the interests  of  exporters  and  importers,  for  whom an efficient
port  system  is  of the  greatest  importance,  especially  in  the  face  of
surcharges  that  may  be applied  by  the  shipping  conferences  for  port  cost,
port  congestion  or port  inefficiency.  In part  they  come  from  the
government's  desire  to  minimize  the  demands  for  funds  that  are  made  upon it
by the  ports,  whether  as  capital  for  investment  in  new  works  or in some
cases  as subsidy  to cover  operating  losses. The  government  may  be called
*tpon  to  make  a contribution  to  the  severance  pay  of redundant  labor,
possibly  with some  mechanism  for  recovering  the  cost;  for  example  in  the
Australian  case  the  plan  is  to finance  these  compensation  payments  by  means
of a per  ton  levy  (Waterfront  Industry,  1989,  page  20).
IV.  Conclusions  and  Recommendations
The  Need  for  Change
57.  Restrictive  practices  are  a  major  feature  of traditional  dock
work.  Their  growth  over  the  years  was  originally  in response  to  the  nature
of the  work  and  the  desire  to achieve  stability  in  the  face  of fluctuating
demand. The  cost  of restrictive  practices  was tolerable  during  the  period
of conventional  cargo  handling,  and  a process  of gradual  change  by means  of
negotiations  was adopted  in  most  cases. The  benefit  associated  with  a
major  restructuring  of labor  agreements  was not seen  to  be  worth  the  cost
of such  changes.- 21 -
58.  The introduction  of bulk and container cargo  handling methods has
changed the  situation.  Restrictive practices are no longer aimed primarily
at making acceptable the demands of dock  work.  They are used now much more
to protect employment in the face of the sut3tantial  productivity increases
made possible by the new methods.  The cost of restrictive practices  has
increased sharply on account of the higher costs of specialized  berths and
ships.  Thete is now a strong  economic pressure to achieve greater
flexibility in  working practice by the removal  of the restrictive
practices.  Associated  with this greater flexibility is an inescapable
decline in employment.
59.  The changes in technology associated  with bulk handling and
containetization have led to major changes in the organization of work, the
organization of labor and in the employer organization.  Work previously
divided by ship  work, quay work and shed work is  now organized on a
terminal basis.  This has facilitated the entry of the private sector into
areas traditionally the responsibility of the port authority and has been
the incentive for  major policy changes on the part of government.  Labor,
previously organized in a general pool, is now required to be more
specialized  with a strong trend towards its allocation to individual
employers.  The traditional pattern of numerous port employers  with minimal
capital investment,  whose main business  was to hire labor from the pool as
required, is giving  way with the emergence of larger and financially  more
solid groupings, capable of investing in equipment and possibiy
installations and of offering permanent employment to their workforce.
60.  Given the worldwide spread of containerized  and bulk transport,  no
country can afford the luxury of continuing  with traditional por  labor
arrangements and their associated restrictive  ptactices.  The cost of their
abolition is a major reorganization  of the port industry  of the country,
the payment of substantial sums in compensation and the risk of industrial
stoppages, but this cost must be faced if the development of exports and
imports is  not to be constrained by port inefficiency.  The figures
available from Australia and elsewhere show that the investment in
compensation  has a high rate of return,  when analyzed in  purely financial
terms and a very high rate of return,  when analyzed in economic terms.
Approaches to Change
61.  Changes in restrictive  practices have to be made in step with
changes in the organization of work.  A piecemeal or gradualist approach is
unlikely to be able to respond sufficiently quickly to the needs of a
changing technology.  Typically successful change  has come from industry-
wide changes. affecting all aspects of work, and a reconsideration  of the
role of public and private sectors.  Privatization usually implies some
transfer of responsibility from one union or working group to another and
in this process offers the possibility  of reform of  working practices.
Changes themselves have varied according to circumstances but share the
characteristics or major changes in labor agreements and in labor
organization, a substantial reduction in the labor force and eubstantial
compensation payments.- 22 -
62.  Government  participation  in the  financing  of the  changes  has  been
necessary  in  most  cases. In  addition  the  achievement  of such  major  changes
in  the  port  sector  has required  the  firm  determination  of government  in the
face  of opposition  from  entrenched  labor  and  other  local  interests. The
investment  in compensation  payments  has  proved  to  be very  cost  effective
and  this  will  normally  be the  case  provided  the  changes  are irreversible.
This  need,  to  ensure  irreversibility,  is  one  important  reason  why
institutional  changes  have  to go in step  with labor  changes.
Role  of the  Bank
63.  Labor  organization  is  a difficult  area  which  for  good  reasons  the
Bank  has traditionally  been  reluctant  to  enter.  ihis  hands-off  attitude  is
no longer  possible  if  effective  use is  to  be made  of Bank  funded
investments  in  port  modernization.  The  appraisal  of any  prospective  loan
including  infrastructure  or equipment  elements  for  bulk  and  container
handling  needs  a careful  analysis  of the  extent  to  which  present  labor
practices  may impede  the  achievement  of  benefits. Such  an  analysis  should
include  an assessment  of the  changes  required  in labor  organization  and
labor  arrangements,  of legal  implications  and  of the  impact  on the  work
force  of the  proposed  investment.  The  cost  of compensation  payments  should
be included  in the  economic  and  financial  evaluation  of the  project,
together  with the  project's  impact  on the  total  wage  bill.
64.  Where  major  changes  are  required  the  Bank  should  encourage  joint
discussions  between  the  government,  public  and  private  sector  interests  and
the  unions  in  order  to define  new  working  arrangements  and  labor  practices.
Efforts  in the  area  of labor  need to  be considered  in  the  context  of  moves
towards  a  greater  participation  by the  private  sector  in  the  operation  of
the  ports. Where  the  privatization  of  all  or  part  of the  cargo  handling
operation  is  contemplated,  it is  essential  to analyze  what associated
changes  in labor  organization  are  implied  and  what opportunities  these  may
offer  for  the  improvement  of  working  practices.- 23  -
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Annex  1
Reforms  in  Australian  Ports 3
Introduction
1.  For  many  years  the  Australian  ports  were  dominated  by the
Waterside  Workers  Fed(,ation  of  Australia  (WWF),  which  had  successfully
united  practically  all  port  labor  into  a  nation-wide  union  of great  power
and  which  moreover  was regarded  as a  pace setter  for  pay,  hours  of work,
terms  and  conditions  within  the  Australian  union  system. The  WWF took  a
leading  political  role  with explicit  political  objectives  and  relations
between  management  and  union  were  often  antagonistic.
2.  With  the  introduction  of new  technology  to the  ports,  especially
containerization,  some  changes  were inescapable  but  granted  reluctantly  and
on condition  that  there  was  no retrenchment  or reduction  in  the  labor
force. This  has  meant  that  there  was,  until  this  year,  virtually  no
recruitment  of labor  for  port  work,  so  that  one  third  of the  workforce  was
over  55  years  of age,  with  a  high  proportion  of  men entitled  to light  work
on account  of disability.
3.  These  same  changes  brought  about  the  need  for  substantial
investment  in  container  related  installations  and  equipment. This  has
proved  an impossible  challenge  for  many  of the  smaller  traditional  'labor
only"  stevedoring  companies,  which  have  been  forced  to amalgamate  (or  to
close)  so that  at present  just  two  companies  dominate  the  stevedoring
industry,  with  about  85Z  of  all  non-bulk  work  between  them. This  has  led
in some  ports  to  a situation  where  arrangements  are  agreed  between  these
two  employers  and  the  WWF,  with  an apparent  reduction  in competition.
Working  prac.ices  in  the  ports  have  been  a constant  source  of criticism
from  port  users,  amongst  whom  one  of the  most  vocal  has  been  the
agricultural  sector,  especially  the  grain  exporters,  who  have complained  of
the  negative effect  of overmanning  and  other  practices  on their  export
costs.
The  Waterfront  Investigation
4.  On account  of the  need to  eliminate  port-related  obstacles  to
Australia's  foreign  trade  and  to  achieve  reliable,  cost-effective  transport
for  exporters  and  importers,  the  Federal  Government  appointed  an Inter-
State  Commission  in 1987,  whose  main  task  was "to  investigate  the
3/  This  annex  is  based  on  material  supplied  by Captain  Colin  Wood  of
Abacus  Marine  Services,  Mackay,  Queensland,  Australia- 26 -
efficiency  of the  handling,  storage  and  movement  nf  cargo  through
Australian  ports  and  to formulate  an integrated  plan for  waterfront
reform". The  Commission  invited  evidence  from  a large  number  of  witnesses
and  also  contracted  a number  of investigators  to  provide  the  necessary
input  data  for  its  work.  The  two  volumes  of the  Commission's  Work,
published  in 1989,  contain  much  valuable  detailed  information  about  the
restrictive  practices  that  were  prevalent  in  Australian  ports,  as  well  as
the  measures  proposed  to eliminate  them. Two  paragraphs  are  quoted  from
the  report  of the  Commission  (Vol  1,  page  54):
"From  1956  labour  redundancies  were  created  by the  introduction  of new
technologies,  including  containerization.  This led  to the  growth  of
practices  that  affect  the  ability  of employers  to  organize  work to
meet  fluctuating  day-to-day  requirements.  These  practices  include
overmanning,  rostering  restrictions,  refusal  to  transfer  to  different
tasks  within  shifts,  equal  placement  on tasks,  and  equality  of
earnings  and  idle  time.
In an earlier  study  for  the  Commission,  the  Centre  for  Transport
Policy  Analysis  estimated  that  an overall  stevedoring  productivity
improvement  of up  to 60 per  cent  is  possible. This,  in turn,  implies
direct  labour  cost  savings  of  nearly  35  per  cent.  Such  productivity
improvements  and  more flexible  work arrangements  would  enable
stevedoring  companies  to  be  more responsive  to  peaks  in labour  demand
and  provide  scope  for  increasing  service  rates  to reduce  queuing.
James  Patrick  and  Company  Pty  Ltd  gave  evidence  that  a 27  per  cent
direct  labour  cost  saving  could  be  achieved  by removing  restrictive
work  practices  alone. This  figure  is  conservative  and  evidence  was
received  to the  effect  that  efficiency  improvements  are  also  possible
in  other  areas."
5.  At the  same  time  the  Royal  Commission  into  Grain  Storage,  Handling
and  Transport  contracted  the  Centre  for  Transport  Policy  Analysis  of the
University  of  Wollongong  NSW  to  assess  the  cost  impacts  of restrictive  work
and  management  practices  on grain  transport  and  handling. Their  valuable
report  estimates  that 'the  cost  penalty  that  restrictive  work  and
management  practices  impose  on  Australian  grain  exports  is  approximately
A$1.50  per  tonne  (US$1.14).  This  cost  is  estimated  to  be allocated  as
follows  (report  pages  ii,  iii):
"Typically,  inefficient  work  practices  within  the  rail  system  account
for  around  25c  of this  total. Significant  areas  include  excessive
manning  on some  shunting  operations,  inefficiencies  and  delays  due  to
train  examination  procedures,  restrictions  on the  working  hours  of
train  crews,  and  delays  in  shedding  staff  made redundant  by two-man
crewing.- 27 -
A variety  of  work  practices  add  perhaps  20c/tonne  to the  costs  within
terminals  and  country  terminals.  These  include  overmanning  at some
sites,  absenteeism  (Newcastle),  job-and-finish  (Newcastle),  excessive
penalty  rates  for  Public  Holiday  work (Victoria  only),  half-hour-on
half-hour-off  by  working  DPI  inspectors  (SA),  and  union  attendance
during  testing  of grain  for  phosphene  (Victoria  only).
Overmanning  on stevedoring  typically  adds  a further  25c,  while  other
inefficient  practices  within  the  port  - eg needless  use  of a  watchman,
excessive  payments  for  mooring  - increase  costs  by lOc.
The  remaining  75c  is the  result  of indirect  effects: cases  where  the
costs  of "production-restricting"  practices  within  one  organization
affect  the  costs  of another.
Restrictive  receival  times  and  discontinuities  on receivals  add
approximately  15c  per  tonne  to the  cost  of land  transport.
Interruptions  to shiploading,  restricted  hours  of loading  and  related
costs  add  a further  60c  to transport  costs.
This  last  component  is  both  the  largest  and  the  most  variable. In
ports  where  berth  space  is in relatively  heavy  demand  - eg Newcastle,
Geelong  - costs  from  this  source  can  run  as high  as $1.20/tonne.  The
introduction  of continuous  working  at Newcastle  is likely  to provide
benefits  of around  $0.85/tonne;  however,  industrial  disputes  and  stop-
work  meetings  have,  in  the  last  year,  added  around  50cltonne  to ships'
costs  at that  port.
In  ports  where  capacity  is  more  generously  provided  - Port  Lincoln,
Albany,  Brisbane  - the  cost  of interruptions  to ship-working  is  much
lower,  in  the  region  of 20c  per  tonne.
The  difference  arises  primarily  from  the  amplifying  effect  that  the
formation  of queues  has  on any  delays  to an individual  vessel."
Recommendations
6.  The  Commission  produced  a  detailed  Waterfront  Industry  Plan. The
basis  of this  is the 'In-principle  Agreement",  to be signed  between  unions,
employers  and  the  Federa]  Government.  On the  basis  of the  In-principle
Agreement,  specific  "Enterprise  Employment  Arrangements"  will  be introduced
at the  major  ports. The  main  elements  of these  agreements  are:
- the  early  retirement  of 3000  men  and  the  recruitment  of 1000
younger  men;
- the  transformation  of  the  1977  General  Agreement  which  regulates
dock  work into  local  enterprise  agreements;- 28  -
- a  move away  from  casual  employment  towards  permanent  employment,
retaining  port  pools  and supplementary  labor  arrangements
according  to the  specific  needs  of individual  ports;
- the  creation  of a skill-related  career  path  with appropriate  wage
relativities;
- training  including  the  retraining  of re-allocated  men;
- acceptance  of the  principle  that  manning  for  bulk  cargo  (and  in
general)  shall  be "in  accordance  with real  operational
requirements"; and
- the  creation  of the  Waterfront  Industry  Reform  Authority  to
supervise  the  implementation  of the  reforms.
7.  The  total  cost  of the  changes  is  estimated  to  be A$303.9  million
(US$231  million)  of  which  over  95?  is represented  by the  retirement
program. Funding  is to  be provided  largely  through  a statutory  tonnage
levy  of  A$1.25  per  ton (US$0.94)  for  non-bulk  cargo  and  A$2.43  per  hour
(US$1.85)  for  bulk  cargoes. Direct  labor  cost savings  are  estimated  to  be
of the  order  of  A$100  million  per  year (US$76  million)  with  an aggregate
direct  saving,  including  the  labor  cost  saving,  of  A$500  million  per  year
(US$380  million). This  excludes  "potential  indirect  cost  savings  that  are
related  to reliability  and  service  and  at least  as large  as the  direct  cost
savings' (report  Vol.  1  P. 165).- 29  -
Annex  2
Peru: Operational  Restrictions  at the  Port  of Callao 4
Introduction
1.  The  purpose  of this  annex  is  to describe  in  general  terms  the
present  situation  in the  port  as it affects  general  cargo  and  the
introduction  of containerized  cargo,  also  to see  the  production  costs  at
the terminal  as a function  of the  equipment  used,  the  physical
infrastructure  and labor  productivity  in  the  tasks  of cargo  handling. The
analysis  has  as its  principal  focus:
- the  identification  of those  labor  practices  which  prevent  a  more
efficient  cargo  handl  ng and  a better  overall  profitability  for
the port;
- the  study  of the  different  measures  adopted  with a  view  to improve
the  productivity  goals  which  should  exist  and  the  successes  (and
failures)  of these  measures.
2.  Overall,  the  port  of  Callao  includes  four  berths  providing  space
for  eight  general  cargo  vessels,  one  berth  for  bulk  grains  with space  for
three  vessels,  one  berth  for  bulk  minerals  and,  on the  same  berth  line,
room  for  three  vessels  with containerized  traffic. In addition  there  are
two  berths  for  oil  tankers  and  one  berth  with  accommodation  for  up to five
fishing  vessels  and  for  the  handling  of fishmeal.
3.  Shore  based  equipment  includes  30  tractors,  70 fork-lift  trucks
with  capability  between  3000  lbs.  and  20 ton,  21 mobile  cranes  with
capacity  between  3 tons  and  30 tons,  port  locomotives  with  20  wagons  and
finally  two  yard  gantry  cranes  purchased  in  1984  for  handling  containers.
Approximately  50Z  of all  this  equipment  is  considered  obsolete  for  present
requirements.  Grain  handling  equipment  consist  of 2 pneumatic  towers  of 75
ton  capacity  and  16 silos  with  a combined  capacity  of  23000  ton. There  is
also  a number  of  portable  conveyors  for  the  movement  of  minerals  and  bulk
fishmeal.
4/  This  annex  was prepared  by Dr Teofilo  Marin  Aliaga,  formerly  a director
of  ENAPU  and  currently  a partner  of Port  Operations  Consultants,  London
and  Lima- 30 -
Labor
4.  Three  groups  of labor  are  employed  in  the  port  of Callao:
a)  personnel of ENAPU;
b)  personnel  employed  through  the  Co-trolling  Commission  ("Comision
Controladora  del  Trabajo  Maritimo");
c)  personnel  employed  by  Customs.
5.  ENAPU  employs  4490  persons  in the  port,  of  whom  2040  are  engaged
in  administrative  duties  and  2450  are  in operations.
The  Controlling  Commission,  which  regulates  the  employment  of casual  labor,
has  responsibility  for  a total  of 1941  persons,  made  up  of:
Main  List  supplementary  list
("titulares")  ("suplentes")
ship  workers  679  450
winchmen  148  105
tallymen  94  61
trolley-men  85  27
shore  men  229  --
Total  1298  643
6.  Customs  has approximately  700  employees  allocated  to  the  work of
the  port. Thus  in summary  approximately  7131  persons  are  directly  employed
in  the  work  of the  port  of Callao,  with in addition  the  personnel  of the
Police,  Coastguard,  Public  Heath,  Agriculture  and  Mining.
7.  The  men  who  work  on  board  ship  are  regulated  through  the
Controlling  Commission  whilst  those  who  work on the  quay  and  in the  sheds
are  employed  by ENAPU. Similarly  the  tally  at shipside  is  provided  by the
Commission  and in  the  sheds  by  ENAPU  personnel.
8.  The  general  cargo  gang  is  made  up in the  following  way:
ENAPU:
1  foreman,  two  tallymen
1  tractor  operator  plus  2  assistants
1  trolleyman
1  shed  foreman  plus  2 assistants
1  fork-lift  truck  operator- 31 -
Controlling  Commission
9  deck  men (including  1 foreman)
10  stevedores  (including  1 foreman)  for  unloading
14  stevedores  (including  1 foreman)  for  loading
3  trolleymen
1  shore-man  working  with the  stevedores
5  dockers  (including  1  foreman)
1  tallyman
1  shoreman  working  with the  dockers
9.  Thus  in total  for  unloading  operations  there  is  assigned  a total
of 46  persons,  whilst  for  loading  operations  the  total  increases  to 50,
with 11 from  ENAPU  and  39 from  the  commission.  These  are  the  allocations
for  the  work of one  hatch,  when  more  than  one  hatch  is  worked,  the  number
of  personnel  allocated  by the  Commission  increases  accordingly,  although
the  number  of ENAPU  personnel  stays  the  same.
10.  For  containerized  traffic,  a reduction  in  personnel  is  possible,
with an allocation  of 5  personnel  from  ENAPU:
1  tallyman
1  operator
3  shed  men (including  1 foreman)
11.  The  Commission,  in the  case  of containerized  cargo,  allocates  a
variable  number,  between  20  and  24,  depending  on the  ship's  equipment;
since  there  is  no shore  container  crane  in  the  port  of  Callao,  all
container  loading  or unloading  operations  have  to  be done  using  ship's
gear.
Form  of Payment
12.  The  form  of  payment  for  personnel  working  in the  port  of  Callao
depends  on the  employer. For  ENAPU  personnel,  payment  is  on a shift  basis,
with a system  of shift  incentives  and for  overtime. Thus  on top  of the
basic  wage,  there  are  increases  of 40%  for  the  shift  incentive,  15?  for
setting  slings,  17.322  for  the  nature  of the  work and  6.5Z  for  meal
allowance. In  addition  there  are  increases  for  overtime  and  for  additional
shifts,  equivalent  to  about  30Z  of the  standard  payment. The  net  result  of
this  is that  to  the  basic  payment  there  has to  be added  approximately
79.122  for  a standard  shift  and  109.12Z  for  overtime  or an additional
shift. Both  the  basic  payment  and  the  percentual  additions  are  negotiated
in the  labor  agreements.  The  ba-ic  payment  is  adjLuted  every  three  months
in line  with the  cost  of living. In  addition  14  additional  days  are  paid
each  year  for  public  holidays.
13.  The  personnel  allocated  by the  Commission  may  be paid  in  one  of
two  ways:- 32 -
a)  the shipworkers are paid on the basis of the tonnage handled by
the gang and for the type of cargo.  For example, for discharging
bagged cargo, the gang of 13 stevedores receives US$5.20 per ton
whilst for loading  bagged cargo, the gang is composed of 17
stevedores  with a payment per gang of US$5.40.  To these costs the
following additional payments are included:  a fallback payment
related to the right to a minimum payment, which is approximately
US$8.30 for an eight-hour shift.  For the complete shift there is
a mobilization payment of 251 plus US$2.50 per day for meals.
Foremen receive a 75% increase in payment, winch operators receive
a 40% increase and those who work in the hold receive 252.  There
is thus approximately a total of 1652 "extras",  loaded on to the
basic tariff.
b)  the tallymen,  dockmen and those  working (for  the Commission) on
the shore are paid on a daily basis, with the actual payment being
made weekly, or every 15 days in the case of the tallymen.  The
basic wage is US2.70 plus a proportion of 1/6 for  work on Sundays
and holidays, plus 15Z for shift change and 8% for extra work,
plus 25% for  mobilization, US$2.50 for meals and 8Z for family
expenses, representing in all an increase  between 70% and 75Z on
the basic wage.  There are in additional some minor differences
between the payments made for different categories of personnel.
These payments are increased on a monthly basis in accordance  with
the cost of living index.
14.  These figures correspond to general cargo.  Similar payments are
made for bulk cargoes  when the operation is done using a mobile conveyor.
For containerized cargo, the system of payment is the same as for general
cargo, though  with the reduced  gang size for ship-workers.  The other
categories of worker receive the same basic wage as for general cargo, plus
60% compensation and 25Z meals.
Syndical Organization
15.  The port of Callao has one of the strongest syndical organizations
in the country, since the Federation of Port and Shipping unions,  which was
established recently, includes the following syndicates:




- shore  workers
- merchant navy:  officers
- merchant navy:  petty officers
- shore personnel (administrative  staff) - CPV
- shore personnel (laborers)  - CPV
- shipping agents personnel- 33 -
16.  As may be appreciated, the Federation represents  a union of both
port and shipping  workers, since it includes  both public and private
sectors, especially the shipping  companies.
Pension Rights
17.  There exist various arrangements for pension rights in the port.
The personnel of ENAPU receive their pension directly from that
organization, in accordance  with law 4916, with some long service personnel
who still benefit from the conditions of the earlier Law 19990 for public
employees.  The difference between the system employed in the port and the
normal terms for a public employee resides in the  way the basic payment is
defined.  There are only three entities in the country  which enjoy these
preferential terms:  these are ENAPU, CPV and the Railways.  The rest are
governed by the norma, Social Security law 4916.
18.  In the case of personnel employed through the Commission, these
enjoy two pensions, one through the law 4916 and the other related to
payments made by port users under the "percentages  for compensation",  which
are governed both by law and by the labor agreement, through a subcommittee
of the Commission.
Labor Legislation
19.  Labor legislation is complex, comprising especially a large number
of Ministerial Resolutions and Management Resolutions which have the effect
of making problems for its interpretation.  Nevertheless, its origin is in
Law 9440 of the Commission for Sea Transport and in the regulations  of the
Port Captaincy and of the Coastguard which, together with the following
have the effect of protecting the position of the port worker:
Law 21952 Retirement of the Maritime Worker
Law 23370 Retirement at age 55
Law 23643 Premium for completing 30 years of service
Law 23707 Compensation for services rendered
Law 23861 Daily payment for sickness
Law 23905 Creation of two pensions
Law 24083 Change from laborer to employee
Law 24405 Exemption from the payment of tax on income for employees.
Labor Practices and their Effect
20.  Whilst the contractual agreements for the port  workers of ENAPU
and those of the Commission are quite separate, they are practically
identical in terms of working arrangements.  The formation of the ship and
shore gangs takes place at the same time and they both start  work at the
same time.  However the problem is that the pace of working of the ship
gang determines the rate of work for the rest of the operation; in case of
a stoppage of work by one group the  whole port is paralyzed.  The shore
gang (with  ENAPU personnel) is paid an hourly rate.  In this case it is_ 34 -
usually  poor  equipment  maintenance  -whether  genuine  or fabricated-  which
affects  the  work  of the  port. These  are  the  traditional  port  practices  in
the  face  of change. Another  aspect  is the  financial  considerations  which
enter  into  all  aspects  of the  work,  especially  of the  ENAPU  personnel  where
any  benefit  received  by the  workers  is received  also  by those  who  negotiate
the  benefit  on  behalf  of the  empresa. In  particular  reference  may  be  made
to the  two  pensions  received  by the  employees  of  the  commission.
21.  Entry  both  to the  shipworkers  and  to the  shore  workers  is
restricted  and  family  traditions  are  strong. New  personnel  are  appointed
as  part  of the  political  process  and  as a result  ENAPU  has  became  totally
burocratized,  dedicating  902  of its  income  to  wage  payments  and  only  10%  to
investment  and  serv  ces.
Impact  of  Containerization
22.  The  impact  of  containerization  was suostantial  in that  there
existed  neither  the  infrastructure  nor  the  equipment  necessary. This  was
the  situation  in  the  early  years  of containerization  (1979-1983)  and  is
still  the  situation  in 1989  with  the same  discussion  of the  most
appropriate  type  of equipment  for  ship  to shore  handling  and  with just  two
cranes  working  in  the  container  yard,  which  is insufficient.  The  best  that
can  be said  is  that  something  has  been  done  to  modernize  berths  5 (C-D-E)
and  to expand  the  area  available  for  containers.  In economic  terms,  the
impact  of containerization  has  been  important  in the  reduction  in  loss  and
damage  for  cargo. The  port  tariff  has  been  amended  for  containers  but for
ship  work the  effect  has  been  less  positive,  although  with a reduction  in
the  gang  size  from  35  to 20-40  depending  on the  type  of vessel  (whether
full-container,  Ro/Ro  or  multipurpose).  The resistance  to containerization
persists,  although  somewhat  reduced,  and  the  inability  to substitute  or to
transfer  the  labor  involved  makes  it impossible  to give  a good  service  to
the  container  vessels  or to  equip  the  port  in the  best  way.
23.  Comparative  average  costs  in  Callao  for  a general  cargo  vessel  and
for  a full  container  vessel  sre  estimated  to be:
Comparative  Charges  to the  Ship (US$  per  ton  Cargo)
Conventional  Container
Vessel  (12000  grt)  Vessel  (32000  grt)
Cargo  handled  1400  ton  4000  ton
1. charges  to the  ship  12.12  11.97
2. stevedoring  cost  3.12  2.12
3.  capitania  2.00  1.53
4. tax  0.17  0.16
Total  17.41  15.78
(on  basis  of I/11270  =  US$)- 35 -
24.  This  table  is  based  on average  productivities  of 62.5  ton  per  gang
hour for  the  conventional  vessel  and  78.1  ton  per  hatch  hour  for  the
container  vessel. This  small  difference  in  productivity  indicates  the
inefficient  working  practices  for  the  full  container  vessel.
Measures  Adopted  to  Improve  Container  Handling
25.  The  principal  measures  taken  include  the  modification  of  berth
5(C-D-E)  for  the  exclusive  use  of container  vessels,  the  expansion  and
marking  of an area  adjacent  to  berth  5 for  container  stacking  and  the
purchase  of specialized  container  handling  equipment,  of  which  the  main
items  are  two  yard  gantry  cranes  and  three  top-lifters.  A number  of
institutional  and  operational  changes  have  been  made:
a)  private  terminals  have  been  authorized  outside  the  port  il.  order
to facilitate  the  movement  of containers.  These  have  their  own
equipment  and  Customs  offices  for  the  clearance  of  containerized
cargo;
b)  special  tariffs  for  container  vessels  have  been  determined  and
separate  tariffs  for  containers  taken  by direct  delivery  and  for
those  that  go to  the  port  storage  yard;
c)  a high  tariff  has  been  applied  to empty  containers,  to  encourage
their  movement  out  of the  port;  and
d)  the  port  syndicates.  through  their  collective  agreements,  have
agreed  to a  modest  reduction  in  the  number  of  men allocated  to
container  vessels,  from  36 to  24.  These  measures  were taken  as  a
result  of pressure  from  port  users  after  a  period  of  chronic
congestion  in the  years  1982-83  from  the  increased  movement  of
containers.
Effect  of the  Measures
26.  The  effect  of containerization  has  been  reasonably  positive  in
operational  terms: the  length  of stay  of the  vessels  has  been  reduced  402
and  the  storage  of goods  for  sorting  and  delivery  within  the  port  area  has
been improved. The  outside  terminals  ("dry  ports")  have  permitted  a  much
more rapid  movement  of the  cargo,  especially  on account  of the  Customs
facility  offered.
27.  The  impact  of the  changes  in terms  of port  income  has  been  less
positive  and  in  particular  the  revenue  from  storage  has  been  reduced  by
the  use  of the  dry  ports.
28.  Labor  has reluctantly  agreed  to the  modest  measures  taken  but  has
strongly  resisted  a total  mechanization  of the  port  on account  of their
fearr  for  loss  of employment.  The  revenue  aspect  is  also  a cause  for
concern  in  that  the  port  of  Callao  in effect  subsidizes  the  other  ports.- 36 -
29.  A number  of  other  factors  impede  the  achievement  of the full
benefits  of  containerization  including:
a)  the  lack  of a ship  to shore  crane  for  container  handling;
b)  the  problem  of  maintenance  for  the  yard  equipment,  especially  the
two  yard  gantry  cranes;
c)  the  lack  of suitably  located  sheds  for  those  wishing  to
consolidate/deconsolidate  containers  within  the  port;
d)  an absence  of focus  by  management  on the  reorganization  necessary
to  accommodate  containerization;
e)  some  relatively  minor  problems  with  Customs;
f)  the  failure  to  modernize  the  working  methods  in the  port (and,  to
some  extent,  in the  dry  ports,  since  these  are  mostly  staffed  by
ex-ENAPU  personnel).
30.  In order  to overcome  these  weaknesses,  it is  suggested  by the
author  of this  annex  that:
a)  a detailed  analysis  of equipi..ent  needs  should  be  made in  order  to
prepare  a plan  for  the  acquisition  of suitable  new  equipment  and
for  the  consequential  civil  works:
b)  p;essure  should  be applied  to achieve  a change  in  thinking  on the
part  of the  ENAPU  management  with respect  to  containerization.  In
particular,  a Container  Unit  should  be established  as  a separate
division  (as  has  been  finally  achieved  for  the  divisions  of Tugs
and  Dredging).
c)  a  complete  revision  of the  labor  agreements  should  be negotiated
with  the  port  and  maritime  unions,  related  to the  technical  need
for  an enhanced  level  of  mechanization;  in  order  to  achieve  this,
the  government  should  define  a special  legal  instrument
exclusively  for  dealing  with  the  issue  of containerization;
d)  all  aspects  of container  control  should  be included  within  the
computer  system  of  ENAPU.- 37 -
Annex 3
Changes in Spanish Ports
Spain
1.  Up to 1986, port labor  was organized, under a paternalist policy,
through the Oficina de Trabajo Portuario (OPT)  of the Ministry of Labor.
The office allocated labor to the cargo handling firms on a daily basis and
paid a fall-back  when there  was no work.  This situation  proved
unsatisfactory on three counts:  first, the OTP was not direct-, concerned
with the profitability  of cargo operations, so tended to give iti  to labor's
demands, second and related, there was  no effective labor  discipline.
Finally, the fall-back  was paid by the state  with an open-ended commitment
and without any self-controlling  cost-driven  mechanism on the size of the
labor force.
2.  In 1986 by law 2/86 (23  May) regulated  by law 371/1987 (13  March),
new bodies were created in each of the major ports to take over the labor
function from the OTP.  These new bodies are constituted as Sociedades
Estatales (State  Corporations),  with participation from the public sector
(51%)  and the private sector (49Z).  Membership in the sociedad is
obligatory for any company that  works in the port.  The sociedades have to
fix their tariffs so as to cover their costs including fall-back  pay, so
that they have an incentive for efficient operation and it is claimed that
successive improvements  have been made in the labor agreements, concerning
gang size.  The first activities of the new sociedades  were to compensate
by premature retirement  a certain number of excess personnel and to
authorize the contracting by the individual  member companies of a certain
number of fixed employees, taken from the casual register, up to a maximum
agreed in each port (for  example 382 in the case of Bilbao).  The following
table shows present and proposed gang sizes at the port of Bilbao under the
new arrangements.
3.  Thus the employers  have designated a number of union members as
"fijos" or permanent employees,  but they do not yet appear to be ready to
make the final step to an all permanent labor force,  which in any case is
strongly resisted by the union, which fears a loss of influence.  There are
strong differences in working practices between the ports, for example,
tonnage (incentive)  payments are made at Barcelona but not at Bilbao.
Union opposition to the formation of the socicdades has been strong and
continues at same ports.38 -
4.  There  are  plans  in the  Ministry  of Public  Works  for  the
restructuring  of the  port  sector,  to form  a type  of  holding  company  in
Madrid  with the  individual  ports  as separate  companies. The  main
motivation  for  this  appears  to  be to strengthen  (central)  financial
controls  and  to reduce  regional  influences  on the  four  autonomous  ports.
Port  of  Bilbao,  Spain  :  Present  and  Proposed  Gang  Sizes
present  manning  proposed  by SEED  1/
cargo  in  on  on  in  on  on
hold deck  land  hold  deck  land
1.  steel  tubes,  bars  & shapes  3  1  3  2  1  2
steel  plate  4  1  4  2  1  2
steel  plate  in  packages  2  1  2  2  1  2
steel  slabs  (load)  3  1  2  2  1  2
steel  slabs  (discharge)  4  1  2  2  1  2
2.  bulks  (load)  (one  to three)  (zero)
bulks  (discharge)  (one  to three)  (one)
3.  scrap  (one  or two)  (one)
4.  bulk  cement  with  pipes  (two)  (zero)
5.  containers  (quay  cranes)  3  1  3  2  1  2
containers  (gantry  cranes)  3  1  1  2  1  0
6.  stuffing/stripping  containers  (two)  (two)
7.  packaged  timber  3  1  2  2  1  2
8.  general  cargo  for  loading
or unlo&ding  including  the
making  up of pallets  7  1  2  3  1  1
9.  palletized  general  cargo  2  1  2  2  1  1
10.  bales  and  packs  4  1  2  2  '  2
cotton  4  1  4  2  i  2
drums (loading)  4  1  2  2  1  2
drums  (unloading)  4  1  4  2  1  2- 39  -
11.  cars without driver:
unload  4  1  2  2  1  1
load  4  1  4  2  1  2
12.  bags (complete ship)  10  1  2  6  1  2
13.  big-bags  3  1  2  2  1  2
14.  fish for reefer hatches:
on pallets  4  1  3  2  1  1
dried  10  1  2  6  1  2
15.  fruit in boxes  4  1  4  2  1  2
16.  frozen products (direct)  (four)  (two)
17.  frozen cargo  10  1  2  6  1  2
18.  paper rolls  2  1  2  2  1  2
pulp (unitized)  3  1  2  2  1  2
pulp (bales)  4  1  4  2  1  2
19.  cargo not requiring
handling manually  2  1  2  2  1  2
20.  rolls of steel:
handled individually  3  1  2  2  1  2
handled in pairs  4  1  2  2  1  1
21.  explosives:
on pallets  3  1  4  2  1  2
to or from pallets  3  1  12  3  1  2
22.  tallymen :  work done under the general tariff  will use tallymen
from the SEED,  when solicited  by the owner of the cargo
1/ SEED :  Sociedad Estatal de Estiba y Desestiba
Source:  based on information supplied by the Port of Bilbao- 40 -
Annex 4
Reform in the Public Ports of Venezuela
1.  In  Venezuela the Instituto Nacional de Puertos (INP) is, in
principle, responsible for all cargo handling work in the public ports,
both on ship and on shore.  The INP is a public sector body whose president
reports to the  Minister of Transport and Communications.  This position  has
resulted from the nationalization  of public port activities in 1936,
followed by further legislation  in 1973 and 1986.  The INP labor is  well
organized and has made numerous advances, particularly in regard to hours
of work and minimum manning.  Restrictive practices are numerous and the
labor  agreement is complex and specific in the benefits it agrees.  A
tonnage payment is made in La Guaira, though in the absence of interport
competition for traffic, this is  not seen to act as an incentive.  Numbers
of men employed in the public ports reached a peak of 20,000 in 1979. This
followed the appointment of 5000 prior to elections and a further 5000
after the election; the current level is about half the peak figure.  Ship
productivity (tons  per ship day) is low on account of the limited  hours
worked and labor productivity is very low on account of over manning.
2.  The increasing  mechanization of port work, coupled  with the non
availability of the publicly owned equipment has meant that the private
sector (ships  agents)  has increasingly  had to bring in its own equipment
and men (from  a different  union) to work on the ships and at times even on
the quay.  This has involved  double payment for the same  work, as the INP
has to be paid in any event. The private sector  has also found it difficult
and at times impossible  to work continuously:  when work is done outside
normal hours, the INP labor  have to be paid extra and the INP is unable to
recover this additional cost in its tariff.
3.  Container ships are manned as though they were  conventional
vessels.  Nevertheless some advances have been made with Ro/Ro ships,  where
a fixed payment is  made for the  notional INP labor,  whilst all work is done
by the private sector, and also in the grain silos.  Further improvement
within the present labor agreements is considered unlikely and the present
policy of the private sector,  with at least some official backing, is to
press for formalization  of their role in cargo handling, the partial or
complete  withdrawal of the INP from this area and for the consequential
compensation of these displaced.  The central problem facing the INP in
implementing  change is the labor  agreement,  whose continuation is legally
related to the continued existence of the INP itself. Present thinking is
that the only feasible options are either a gradualist approach, attempting
to improve the present agreement  or a strongly reformist  approach, paying
off (with  substantial compensation) those included in the present labor
agreement so that only those needed may then be re-engaged.  These options
are currently under review  by the government.Tons per Man/Year
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